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Whaf s Theory Got To Do With It?
Problems, Processes and Purposes for Archaeological Explanation (74 pp.)
Director: Thomas A. Foor
There is an ongoing dialog on the purposes and methods of archaeology.
This is a result in part, of our compelling and somewhat urgent need to know
the "unknowable" past. Theory is used to make understandable (the "need"
to know) a specified set of archaeologically derived phenomena. This criteria
points us down the road of science. Traditionally, there has been a historically
developed focus on more upper-level or macro-theoretical processes which
have been implicitly accepted, and have played a normative role in
archaeology by prescribing many activities of investigation. Theoretical
debates have demonstrated how unsatisfactory many of these upper-level
theoretical prescriptions have been. These debates have been fueled by the
unrealized expectations of these upper-level theories. Besides a growing
dissatisfaction with theory, archaeologists are also troubled by gaps between
theory and data, and by what seems to be the quite specious ease by which
archaeological reasoning too often leaps these gaps.
As presently constituted, the so-called "science" of archaeology and
particularly architectural anthropological theory is in a state of imperfect
"scientific" form. It lacks a clarification of terms and definitions ie., the
unambiguous observational language regarding the objective section of the
real world. The proposal herein, is to promote more inductively based
anthropological architectural approaches with respect to investigation and
ultimate descriptions, resulting in more "grounded" archaeological
explanations. Inductive approaches begin with (i.) sensory perceptions of
concrete phenomena (ii.) which create scientific assumptions (or hypotheses)
verified according to well defined terms, and (iii.) finally the development of
general rules or llieories. This process calls for the initial de-emphasis of
more abstract metaphysical considerations eg., religion, symbolism,
cosmological findings. The proposal described herein, underlines the
importance of the development of critical standards with which to judge how
well theories, explanation, strategies, and research programs fulfill their goals
and purposes.
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Preface
The book entitled The Master Masons of Chartres, by John James, is a story of
the building and meanings of the structure identified as. Our Lady of
Chartres. Today Chartres is almost exactly as men saw it seven hundred years

ago.
Other cathedrals of the Christian world have not known how to say so
many things, nor how to say them in such splendid order (Emile Male,
cited in James 1990:1).
Chartres, which is located in France, is a spectacular Christian cathedral that
was relatively completed in the 1230's. It is known as a great work of art. Even
though this structure was built in Europe in a period of the historic record,
and therefore should be well documented, "Chartres seems to pose as many
riddles as the Sphinx. The books and theories on it are endless" (James
1990:4). For example, a researcher is faced with questions such as: (1) Was it
the first architecture to enhance structure above that of form? (2) Why is it,
that though it was such a work of genius, "The design is not a well controlled
and harmonious entity, but a mess" Qames 1990:9)? (3) Why was this great
work of art, not thought through to the end before it was begun? (4) Why was
it such a revolutionary and experimental type of architecture for its time?
Little is known of the builders. There are no known documents or legends
about the masters of Chartres. We are left primarily with an interpretation
through the examination of its structure. This examination has shown, that
it is an amazing accumulation of historic events set in stone.

With these thoughts in mind, imagine a Chartres (call it "Structure A-IV")
located instead at a site in a region of the Maya Lowland. In addition, view it
1
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as being in the same condition as the best of the large monumental Classical
architecture of the Maya, and with a paucity of historical information
regarding its construction and builders. Assume at a minimum that you
correctly determined that it was likely, that it was some type of religious
edifice. Given the hindsight of the knowledge of the mysteries surrounding
the present day Chartres (remember it is the same as it was seven hundred
years ago), it would certainly give one pause to even begin to think about
addressing the complexity of meanings inherent in this "Maya" structure.
Taken a step further, how could one hope to provide meaningful
explanations or "truths" of prehistoric Maya architecture of any type?
Complicating these issues is the fact, that the process of explanation is far
from a matter of simply applying an agreed upon methodology and
theoretical guide.

The examination of one aspect of archaeological inquiry ie., architecture, is
used in this thesis. This example is used in order to illustrate in part, the
dilemma of what I view as the disruptive acrimony, disorder, incoherency,
political biases, and confusion regarding the theoretical processes of the
realities of explanation and ethics in anthropology and archaeology (Kuznar
1997:4-5). Maya architecture, as used in this thesis, has a particular analytical
potential, though historical analysis of this particular architecture often relied
upon subjective assessments of scale and quality of those structures rather
than more empirical, quantitative studies (Abrams 1994:5). Therefore, its lack
of "analytical" background as well as its analytical potential makes it a good fit
for the proposed methodology discussed herein.

Perhaps architecture is also appropriate due to the fact that the "post

modernism" movement, which is impacting anthropology and archaeology
today has its roots in architecture. Post-modernism and the critical theorists
in essence, contend that there is not a real knowable world. This has put
pressure on archaeologists adhering to scientific goals to be even more
objective in providing credible methodologies, and hence explanations.

As a result, an emphasis on a scientific methodology is proposed regarding
the examination of the material record in as non culturally specific way as is
possible. At the same time it is recognized that, ..."Scientific knowledge is
always partial, and never exempt from political, cultural and ethical biases"
(Kuznar 1997:X). In this case, the material record discussed is that of Maya
architecture (principally from the Classic period).

I am concerned (after having examined some of the more contentious
theoretical debates in the discipline) that by mentioning even a portion of a
known method or theory, that one is then "tagged," that is, you are
automatically placed in the appropriate "theory box" with all the labels,
critiques, analysis, history and other baggage that goes with it. It certainly
makes one reluctant to use the more theoretical terminology of the discipline
(particularly because most of it is so ill-defined), due to the emotion and bias
that seems to accompany it. Therefore, an advanced disclaimer is hereby
made, that unless specifically stated otherwise, I am not adopting any one of
these so-called "isms," nor am I making an intentional effort to "fit" specific,
existing, defined theoretical or methodological structures into the text of my
opinions or conclusions, other than in the general sense of a scientifically
inductive approach.
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Upon the completion of this thesis, the thought came to mind that the source
of much of the theoretical rhetoric comes, not only from attempting to
explain the past, but from learning to "cope" with the past. That is, we are
consumed with a craving for knowledge and a "need to know" what came
before. This may be a result of some urge for control by Western civilization,
as well as a need for understanding. In other words, is there a compulsion to
acquire knowledge on our terms and as quickly as possible? Therefore, if
during this effort "truths" cannot be obtained (and of course they won't be)
then we need to leam to "cope" with that fact and accept our theories on that
basis. This is where a scientific methodology may play a key role. Under this
scenario, "theorists"may be more useful if they would direct their initial
efforts towards developing accepted methods of obtaining objective, empirical
data, and worry about the ultimate and generalized explanations later.

Introduction
How many a dispute could have been deflated into a single paragraph
if the disputants had dared to define their terms (Aristotle, as quoted in
Kuznar 1997:1).
The initial objective is to critically examine some of the significant aspects of
archaeological inquiry, that is, the theoretical and/or methodological. Then, a
methodology is suggested that pursues the ultimate goal of archaeological
"explanation" with respect to the material record, in this case that of Maya
architecture.

In keeping with the methodological spirit of this thesis, and to avoid
misunderstandings and miscommunications that seem to plague the
discipline, it is appropriate at the outset to define the basic terms being used,
as each of us may have something else in mind. The Brockhaus-Encyclopedia
(1987) defines "theory" as "the scientifically summarizing of teaching to
explain a complex of phenomena with the systematic goal of setting related
objects in a proper order" (Egenter 1992:51, Emphasis added). The narrower
definition: "A system of validated hypotheses that explain phenomena
scientifically," is more in keeping with the direction herein (Haviland
1994:20, Emphasis added). At the same time, it is important to be reminded of
the meaning of the word "explanation" as it is often used herein. It is ... "the
act of making plain or comprehensible, to offer reasons for the cause of" (The
American Heritage Dictionary, Emphasis added). David Clark wrote that:
Archaeology ... is the discipline with the theory and practice for the
recovery of unobservable hominid behavior patterns from indirect

5
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traces in bad samples (Trigger 1986:8).
However, the definition with the most appropriate, precise and applicable
meaning (as it is more "methodological") for this thesis, is that of Albert C.
Spaulding:
Archaeology is not a science nor is it history or a himianity; it is instead
a technique or group of techniques, a way of recovering knowledge
about past human activities through the material remains of those
activities (Spaulding 1988:263, Emphasis added).
The techniques in this instance are to be based principally in science. Though
it sound trite, Clarke's comment about "indirect traces in bad samples" should
be kept in mind as these "techniques" (principally from the humanities and
natural sciences) are developed to pursue only possible explanations, and not
truths about archaeological data and human behavior.

The nature of the archaeological material record is presumably the product of
both "natural" and behavioral processes. By "natural" it is meant, that the
artifacts are altered by the natural processes of aging, material degradation,
erosion and the like, therefore the application of natural sciences is
appropriate for analyzing material evidence. Because this material record is a
product of both natural and behavioral processes there are the inevitable
disagreements among archaeologists over what kind of record archaeology
forms (Kosso 1991:621). In addition, there is a variety of positions among
archaeologists over appropriate methods for the discipline, and issues which
involve the status of reality, the evaluation of competing claims, and the
politics of research (Kuznar 1997:20).

For example, Lewis Binford in a search for objectivity and using natural
science, tests the causal connections between things in the past and their
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remains found in the present. On the other hand, Ian Hodder is perhaps
more "interpretive" in that he believes you must view artifacts in the context
of the ideas and norms during their manufacture and use. That is, the
evidence and the artifact of interest is one of signification rather than of
causation (Kosso 1991:622). However, the point here is not to resolve and
explain the differences and similarities among individuals such as Hodder,
Binford, Michael Schiffer and others. It is merely to illustrate a sample of the
archaeological dialogs that exist regarding what to do with the material
record, and how to go about explaining it.

For the foregoing reason ie., the sorting out what people mean through their
dialogs, and a lack of well defined terms, archaeology, at least on the
theoretical level, has become a discipline that appears to spend much of its
time in contentious debates (ie., paradigm anarchy) about science,
interpretation, processualism, modernism, post-modernism, and the like.
Apparently, Bruce Trigger believes that as a result of these debates, a less
narrow and sectarian, as well as more promising views of archaeology have
been produced (Trigger 1986:1). However, after a review of the relevant
literature, one may question the justifications for that view

Paul Courbin (as quoted in Watson 1992:165) remarked that.
The role of archaeology is, I think, one that the archaeologist alone can
play under the most favorable conditions: the establishment of the
'facts' relevant or not.
Though, this thesis, by its scientific emphasis seems to discuss that "relevant
or not" view, it is not calling for a final "just-the-facts-folks" type of an
approach. Instead, the primary aim is for the establishment of the facts by
scientific objectivity (and then "explanation" in whatever form it takes), even
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if it isn't humanly possible to achieve this ideal of absolute objectivity
(Shanks and Tilley 1987:46).

The essential goal is not only to form a methodology to develop and test
hypotheses in an objective a manner as is possible (working to rid science of
bias) and to provide the scientific basis for a better understanding of all
known facts, but to put greater theoretical emphasis on that process. How do
we get at being objective? General theoretical deductive paradigms may
eventually play some role, but not in the first instance. The emphasis is first
on the initial inductive methodologies. Hypotheses are inductively built on
the basis of inference from observations and then we test these hypothesis by
checking implications deduced from them (Kuznar 1997:45). Underlying this
analysis of the scientific cycle is how one goes about the primary development
of objective empirical data before relating that data to our ideas. This is the
heart and core of archaeology ie., developing the proper methods of
systematically recording the outside world.

The ultimate goal is to create knowledge generally acceptable in the discipline
and to identify and give scientific meaning to that "specified" set of
phenomena we are theorizing about. Of course, we will continue to strive for
the best explanation of phenomena, but that explanation will always remain
open to systematic, scientific revision (Kuznar 1997:33). This initial objective
is not to develop supporting arguments for established theories, or to
establish truths.

How do we best continually develop, evaluate and accommodate the data in
the context of archaeology? Will this emphasis make archaeology a more
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viable discipline? How can we move away from ... "the acrimony we now
experience in academia and elsewhere" among many anthropological as well
as archaeological theorists (Kuznar 1997:4)? It may be helpful to examine
some of the problematic aspects of general archaeological theory and those
that voice those theories, the so-called "theory-heads." How appropriate and
beneficial are the various "schools" of more abstract theory to archaeology
and in providing direction for meaningful explanations of the incomplete
data? The search here is for narrower "normative" standards with which to
judge how theories and explanation strategies accomplish their defined
purposes.

The proposed approach and its central role in interpretation, may be open to
criticism as more or less of a ..."mechanical application of a naive positivism
dressed up as scientific procedure" (Yoffee and Sheratt 1993:2). That is, these
techniques of systematic observation are of the "positivist/empirical"
discourse, and therefore, are "disabling capitalistic ideologies." Post
modernists and critical theorists allege that ..."neither the experience nor the
interpretive activity of the scientific researcher can be considered innocent"
(Kuznar 1997:17).

In response, these propositions have to be examined in their total context.
Because facts are theory-laden most knowing scientists "heed" the danger of
bias.
One means of limiting the biasing effect of facts being theory-laden is
to treat all theories, hypotheses, definitions, and even observations as
hypotheses that must be tested, and that, surviving scrutiny, need
further corroboration before provisionally being accepted as scientific
fact... In the end, a scientific use of reflexivity will provide for more
valid data, a condition for robust theory testing (Kuznar 1997:220).
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At the same time one must keep in mind that in the end, prehistoric people
and their cultures do matter The intent is not to ..."investigate and create a
world purged and divested of meaning (and value), an unreal and alienated
world" (Shanks and Tilley 1987:66). It is understood, that an object may have
meaning above description that involves the subjectivity of the aesthetic,
supernatural, morality, ethics, and religion. However, viewed in its entirety,
the theme herein is a long ways from Ian Hodder's statement that,
... it is only when we make assumptions about the subjective
meanings in the minds of people long dead, that we can begin to do
archaeology (Hodder, cited in Yoffee and Sheratt 1993:5).
The objective here is only to set the "stage" for better explanations, which will
allow eventual respect for alternate versions of the past and create stability in
archaeology. It is not to answer questions such as why the archaeological
record should be studied.

This renewed emphasis on the structure of the development (logic and
epistemology) and eventual application of reliable empirical data, is justified
in order to hopefully evaluate create, challenge and eventually focus more
"grounded" theoretical paradigms. This is a concentration on the
reexamination of the dialogue between the objects or facts, and the
archaeologists (Irwin-Zarecka 1993:89). In the end, the "truths" of the past will
depend much on the way people view or experience the investigations.
Professor Indiana Jones, a follower of Wittgenstein, stated: "Archaeology is
about facts; if you want the truth, go next-door to the Philosophy
Department" (Bintliff 1993:100).

In the illustration regarding Maya architecture, the objective is not to develop
laws of architectural anthropology or to explain or interpret the intricate
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aspects of Maya monumental architecture. For the present, John Lloyd
Stephens descriptions (as hereinafter set forth) will have to suffice. It is to
return to perhaps more traditional approaches of piecing together and
understanding the data. This type of archeological emphasis may signify the
mundane or a retreat to some, as its importance seems to have taken a back
seat to those more theoretical pursuits that ..."are primarily concerned with
explicating, defending, or attacking a way of doing archaeology" (Fagan
1996:711).

The point is that there has been a considerable disparity between the forms of
explanation advocated by
... the partisans of various isms and those actually employed and
found effective by working archaeologists (Colin Renfrew, dted in
Renfrew, Rowlands and Seagraves 1982:20).
As a result, Renfrew believes that the theorists generally lack credibility and
their formulations may seem at times to be irrelevant to the development of
archaeological theory At the same time, theory developed by the "working"
archaeologist often appears to be lacking in both logical form and in any clear
awareness (if the research is valid) of what constitutes good explanation. On
the plus side, Jeremy A. Sabloff apparently believes that archaeologists are
now attempting to employ more rigorous or "scientific" procedures (Sabloff
1994:13). Depending on how you define "more" and in comparison to what
went before, this is appears to be a step towards challenging intuitively based
understandings.

Why be concerned about theorists that develop these ..."tacit and fuzzy set of
assumptions concerning the nature of the archaeological record and human
societies, the proper tasks of archaeology, the structure of scholarly inquiry

12
etc." (Fagan 1996:711)? Why be concerned about the "theory-heads?" The
concern relates to the development of the discipline. These individuals have
influence. They are quoted. They are studied. Their books are purchased. They
lecture. They form the conceptual component, the theoretical of schools of
archaeology. They seem to command the primary stage of the discipline. Most
importantly, they play a "normative' role in that their assumptions prescribe
some activities and goals of the discipline (Fagan 1996:710-711).
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Part 1 - The Emotional - Subjective Approach to Interpretation
The Subjective Aesthetics
There are both emotional and intellectual meanings to be found in the
archaeological record. It is appropriate to start this discourse with the more
emotional, or metaphysical "theory" of the aesthetics. It is one we can all
understand or at least appreciate. From this point on, explanations become
harder to comprehend.

One of the fathers of Maya archaeology is John Lloyd Stephens (1805-1852).
After he first entered Copan in present day Honduras, he wrote:
Architecture, sculpture, and painting, all of the arts which embellish
life, had flourished in this overgrown forest; orators, warriors, and
statesmen, beauty, ambition, and glory, had lived and passed away, and
none knew that such things had been, or could teU of their past
ejdstence. Books, the records of sucli knowledge, are silent on this
theme. The city was desolate. No remnant of this race hangs round the
ruins, with traditions handed down from father to son, and from
generation to generation. It lay before us like a shattered bark in the
midst of the ocean, her masts gone, her name effaced, her crew
perished, and none to tell whence she came, to whom she belonged,
how long on her voyage, or what caused her destruction; her lost
people to be traced only by some fancied resemblance in the
construction of the vessel, and, perhaps, never to be known at all. The
place where we sat, was it a citadel from which an unknown people
had sounded the trumpet of war? or a temple for the worship of the
God of peace? or did the inhabitants worship the idols made with their
own hands, and offer sacrifices on the stone before them? All was
mystery, dark, impenetrable mystery, and every circumstance increased
it (Stephens 1993:39-40).
This short passage is found in Incidents of Travel in Central America,
Chiapas, and Yucatan (the original work was a best seller in 1840, with 12

printings and selling 20,000 copies in three months). It is revealing in several
respects. One can see that Stephens had an "emotional" reaction through
which was evidenced an initial interpretation of the scene before him
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(Stephens 1993:60). He envisioned that at one time "architecture, sculpture
and paintings," had flourished in Copan, that its society consisted, in part, of
"orators, warriors, and statesmen." It was apparent to him that this culture
had seen both ambition and glory. This is one method of interpretation,
though perhaps somewhat simplistic, that cannot be measured in an
empirical scientific manner Yet, it is a type of theoretical approach as one of a
theory of cognition (Egenter 1990:57). The "value," emotional or otherwise for
Stephens may have been only that the ruins "existed." Perhaps, he viewed
such architecture and other material artifacts primarily as a form of art.
However, even for Stephens the emotional reaction and value in this scene
apparently wasn't enough. Prophetically, he seeks more even as the
paragraph develops.

Therefore, Stephens comment that, ..." her lost people to be traced only by
some fancied resemblance in the construction of the vessel, and, perhaps,
never to be known at all," is prescient in the sense that, archaeologists have
subsequently attempted to "(re)construct" this vessel in various theoretical
images. The end of the phrase ..."perhaps, never to be known at all," certainly
foretells some of the theoretical problems we are currently dealing with.
However, an emotional and aesthetic interpretation doesn't quite suffice to
satisfy the archaeologisf s need to know.

There is another factor that is interesting to note (ie., given the history of the
continuous flux of interpretations of material remains). One hundred years
after Stephens' death, the leading Mayanists of the day, including J Eric
Thompson and Sylvanus Morley, though praising Stephens, rejected certain
of his emotionally based observational explanations. Subsequently, these
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same observations of Stephens were determined to be true after all (Stephens
1993:7). This small fact either portends either (a) the problems to come with
many of the fluctuating, superfluous, ill-conceived theoretical paradigms that
exist today, or (b) is an example of the self-correcting nature (scrutiny and
eventual falsification) of science.

Part II - The Intellectual - Rational Approach to Interpretation
(A.) Problematic Aspects of Archaeological Inquiry - the Fast Past
This section builds the case for the emphasis and development of a revised
and renewed methodology for archaeological explanation. Though one might
expect to see some tmified community of ideas and approaches in the study of
prehistoric cultures, that hasn't been the case. Typically, competing
"theoretical schools" or stances have arisen and claimed to have a privileged
status in determining what constitutes valid explanation in archaeological
research (Yoffee and Sheratt 1993:1).
With prehistory we enter a world of few facts and much guesswork, a
world moreover which is ruled by archaeologists. This is worrying;
while field-work has become an exact and exacting craft, archaeological
discussion is often as much an indulgence as a discipline; where they
might exchange hypotheses archaeologists are apt to demand
adherence to polemics or charges of corruption (Colin McEvedy, dted
in Yoffee and Sheratt 1993:119).
With few facts and much guesswork, there will always be a degree of
ambiguity in the research product of prehistoric material data (Sabloff
1994:57). If you add to the equation, that (1) notions of pure scientific
objectivity in the study of the past have been untenable, and will no doubt
remain that way, (2) large amounts of data have been coming in over the past
100 years which have yet to be fully digested, and (3) there are data that will
be, or may never be discovered, then, you end up with huge "gaps" in the
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archaeological record. Thus, the theoretical schools have become grounded in
partial bodies of empirical material, and in addition, react to proceeding
theoretical positions that are themselves likely to be superseded eg., the
preceding Thompson and Morley illustration (Yoffee and Sheratt 1993:1).
Given these factors, what role (directly and indirectly) can theory play in the
process of explicating, defending, or attacking ways of "doing archaeology?"
The theoretical structure and purpose of the discipline appears to have
become somewhat obscured.

At the core of the present state of theory in archaeology, is the inherent
complexity of human behavior, as well as the generally unsettled nature of
the material record. Also, this state is likely to continue if there is past human
behavior without modem referents. This would be a disturbing prospect to
those who practice "ethnoarchaeology" as a part of their theoretical
methodology. This raises the issue of "limits" in archaeology and the
possibility of an unintelligible past (ie., oblivion), at a time when the
prevalent attitude is that oblivion or unintelligibility is unacceptable in our
"age of progress" (Murray 1993:177-179). You end up with problems resulting
from general theoretical efforts to create a "fast past" ie., an explanation with
foundational weaknesses.

There is a compelling need for truth and/or fiction, because of the fact that
the "ultimate explanations" are likely to be irretrievable. These so-called
truths or fictions are dependent on one's own perceptions and
preconceptions. As a result, we end up with data generated by us in our
"terms," whereby our knowledge of the record is shaped by the cultural
constructions of the observer (Binford 1989a:57). With a lack of recognition or
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appreciation of the limits of our ability to explain human behavior and the
associated material record, we have ended up with unsatisfactory, essentially
deductively produced general or macro theory. This has all contributed to the
rise of the post-processual or post-modernist movements. There is the
significant likelihood that these issues will continue to obfuscate the practice
of archaeology for the foreseeable future.

Another picture of the "problem with explaining data" as described by
Norman Yoffee and Andrew Sheratt, is that interpretations from the
collection and analysis of data have
... relied on assumptions and analogies - theories or parts of theories that have been drawn from other disciplines. These theories have been
used to model extant archaeological data by specifying the logically
entailed, but non-existent data required by the overarching
assumptions and analogies (Yoffee and Sheratt 1993:8).
For the purpose of analysis, the general theoretical schools described here, are
only a portion of the larger more generalized analytical structure. These types
are more of the "macro," rather than the "microtheories" (ie., the container
and the contents) (Egenter 1990:23). Many of the problematic "theory" types
being discussed here, are those of a primarily syllogistic or more deductive,
macro-type assumptions, rather than inductively produced "covering" type of
generalizations used to explain empirical data (Bamforth and Spaulding
1982:191). (This does not mean to imply that "micro" deductive theories are
not used along with the inductive at the lower theoretical and/or
methodological levels.)

(B.) The Subjectivity of Theory Making - The Theory Miner^s Menu
An example of the forbidding territory of examining the meaning of a theory
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and inherent risks of miscommunication and misunderstanding that lie
therein (see Aristotle's quote, page 5) comes into play in the readability of that
theory. The following quote is but a small example.
Building on the postempiricist pole of Middle Range Theory (MRT)
Binford now has explicitly acknowledged paradigm relativism [but not
irrational paradigm shifts (Binford and Sabloff, 1982)] and stresses the
importance of conceptual growth to the development of science of
archaeology (Binford, cited in Tschauner 1996:21).
This quote is "plucked" from an article by Hartmut Tschauner of Harvard. It
is not specifically quoted for its substantive content for this thesis, only as
being a sample of a fairly typical dialogue. However, upon analysis it
demonstrates some key elements that are evident in the theoretical dialogue.
Of course, there is the need for an understanding of all the terminology as the
author and the proponents intended (even words such as science and
archaeology). Naturally, you must have a background in the field as these
articles are written only for academics. It also compels a personal viewpoint,
or perhaps bias with respect to Binford (and/or Schiffer), Sabloff, and
Tschauner

What perspectives do each of them bring; does the reader respect Tschauner's
opinion, what is Tschauner's agenda; what is behind the term "irrational
paradigm shifts;" what exactly did Binford and Sabloff say in their 1982, and
1986 articles; how important are the time frames of the articles; and what does
this all mean for practicing archaeology? This is only a very small sample of
the dialectic dialogues that archaeology is overly consumed with. That is,
there is a continuous discussion of others conceptions as well as personalities;
what do they mean, in whose context, and most importantly to what end?
How much help are these exchanges in developing, guiding or directing
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"appropriate" inquiry to provide "explanations?"

The "Schools :"To get a sense of therange of sut^ectivity or the untested
assertions of theoretical insight, a quick look at some of the more popular
theoretical or conceptual frameworks provide additional hints of the
problematical status of general theory. Individually these theories
demonstrate, that theory in archaeology is not only abstract, but has perhaps a
greater diversity than in other "scientific" disciplines. Of the general problems
with theory-making, there is not only this lack of clarity, but the attempt to
propose unobservable structures and mechanisms, often with some historical
orientations, with a partial data base, and with problematic "laws" of human
behavior. Tim Murray even goes so far as to state, that "The data of
prehistoric archaeology remains over-theorized and radically unstable"
(Murray 1993:183, Emphasis added). There appears to be little question that in
the end, archaeological theory matches in complexity, the complexity of
human behavior (Spaulding 1988:269). Many of the following examples of
differing theories or models of explanation are used to examine differing
issues eg., specific conditions, patterns of events, classes of events, or
enduring processes at work in society. The objective here is to merely give
one a sense of the dazzling number of approaches that we are faced to sort
through and "apply" today.

One might start with the perspective of the conceptual frameworks of
traditional, more systematic, classificatory approaches. Then, (assuming you
can effectively decipher the differences) we have including, but not limited to,
the following: archaeology that is idealist, materialist, normative,
interpretive; the conjunctive, social interpretive, cultural-historical, and
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cultural ecology approaches; processualism, behavioralism,
antiprocessualism, structuralism, post-structuralism, post-processualism,
cognitive-processualism synthesis, neo-evolutionism, processualfunctionalism, positivists, mechanical-positivists, emanationist, refutationist,
empiricism, post-empiricism, modernism, amodernism, post-modernism,
anti-post-processual, critical (skeptical) post-modernism, moderate
(affirmative) post-modernism, contextualism, archaeological archaeology,
Marxism and other radical archaeologies.

With any of these approaches, obstacles may arise with too broad an
application, and unjustified hypotheses which may be too constraining
(Renfrew and Bahn 1991:406-411). The quandary is that you can find anything
you want to support your line of argimient (Schiffer 1981:900). What happens
is that these theoretical utterances, for the most part, end up being "imposed"
on the past (Hodder 1991a:8). The danger is that practitioners might,
consciously or unconsciously, and even in the face of discorifirming
data,"retain frameworks of interpretation or explanation because they
cannot think their way to new frameworks, or because the impact of
such changes on the cognitive map by everyone else would be to great
(Murray 1993:183).
There is additional confusion when theoretical models from other disciplines
suddenly show up with all of their own history Does archaeology really need
many of these models of inquiry that have been appropriated from science,
philosophy or that otherwise originated through the older physical sciences?
Which theories and variations thereof and for what explanations are being
sought? Unfortunately, there is no ultimate arbitrator nor methodology of
"grounding" that can sort these perspectives out. At this point in time, one
individual's view of the past is as good as another, at least as viewed by the
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critical theorist (Renfrew and Bahn 1991:430). Perhaps now is a good time to
refer to Irene Peter Thomas' quote, "Today if you are not confused, you are
just not thinking clearly" (Thomas 1989:57). What this seems to point to is a
need for new focus on what should be the normative guidelines for
archaeology.

Ancillary Theory and Distractions: Its not over, because we must also deal
with the various adjunct and/or tautological theories of these "schools." For
example, in the case of the post-modernists, one might be referring to the
writings of Jean Baudrillard and Umberto Eco, and particularly their work on
copies and originals in America (Bruner 1994:397). Then, there are not only
these strains, strands and variations of all of the above, but a multitude of
interpretations and misunderstandings with respect thereto.
Yet it is surprising how difficult it is to define and understand what is
happening. The more I try to tie down post-modernism, the less
coherent it seems ... the growth of style seems bigger than the
individual's attempt to characterize it (Ian Hodder, cited in Knapp
1996:132).
A possible result of the problem of miscommunication is the development or
"growth" of some of these ancillary theories.

How do we get around the fact that the results of other archaeologists'
research is dependent on a host of theories (Tschaimer 1996:14)? The question
is not only which theoretical viewpoints should we use, but whose
definitions or interpretations and out of what texts? Brian Pagan summarizes
this particular dilemma well.
Since the meaning of any one term is seldom independent of the
meaning of many, if not all other terms in theory, changes in the
meaning of one term will usually have the consequences for the
meaning of all other terms (Pagan 1996:711).
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Also, what do we do about those consuming "intra" questions eg., will there
be "rapprochement" between the radical Marxists and processual archaeology
(Saitta 1992:01)? Will Binford and Schiffer come to terms? Is the methodology
of Lewis Binford's MRT and the hermeneutic archaeology of Ian Hodder
really very similar (Kosso 1991:621)? Does it matter?

Finally, there are the problematic assumptions by some, who believe that they
are (1) writing objective, apolitical, ideology-free archaeology, and (2) they
know what the world of culture is like and therefore, they are ordering the
world of archaeological experience in those a priori terms (Binford 1989b:5256). What purpose do the current dialogs serve, other than to clog or obfuscate
the study and goals of explanation?

Intradisciplinary Diversions: After even a cursory review of the literature,
one questions the productivity of deciphering the arguments among the
various theoreticians. Along with the misunderstandings and
incomprehension of most general theory, time and resources are taken up
with arguments of comprehension and about (a) what they have seen, (b)
what they say about what they have seen, (c) what is implied by about what
they see, and (d) what are worthwhile ideas (Sabloff, Binford and McAnany
1987:203).

The most annopng distractions and obstructions are the efforts of some to
"personalize" the dialogue of the discipline. These "efforts" interfere with
respective theory analysis and raise questions of credibility. It may reach the
point that it greatly colors the proposition, for example; (1) New
Archaeologists are "overly credulous simpletons" (Watson 1990:165). (2) Paul
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Courbins' statement "Quotations are strung together with devastating effect,
quotation marks trivialize key words, and proofs that New Archaeologists
have fallen flat on their faces time and again are wonderful" (dted in Watson
1990:164). (3) Ian Hodder has concluded that, "North Americans often
pronounce words wrongly" (Hodder 1991:7, Emphasis added). It is very likely,
that recognized and unrecognized personal biases become converted over
time into unquestioned assumptions which in turn influence the kinds of
data collected, and the ways they are interpreted.

(C.) Attempting to Make Theory Work - Pushing the Rock Up the Hill
Today, American archaeologists are mostly "processual," and one which sees
archaeology as a scientific study that works with generalizing principles of
cultural processes, and with the formation of deposits of archaeological
remains, with attempts to explain the genesis of the archaeological record and
to discover its relevant attributes (Tschauner 1996:1-4). The central issue is in
seeking patterns in the formal and spatial properties of artifacts. It postulates
that there is a high degree of regularity in human behavior (Trigger 1986:2).

In connection with processualism's goals of cultural reconstruction, some socalled theoretical middle range generalizations (hereinafter, "MRT") have
been developed which see ... "archaeology as a scientific study that works with
generalizing principles of cultural processes" (Tschauner 1996:1). The effort
has been led by Lewis Binford, and to some extent Michael Schiffer.

Binford deals with the step from the material record to the dynamics of the
past societies by "generalizing analogies with what we observe in the present"
(Tschaxmer 1996:1-2). Binford believes that inferences about the past
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understanding can be determined by understanding how living.
contemporary cultural systems work (ie., a deduction of consequences).

Schiffer's behavioral "methodological transformation theory" approach
(which splits up cultural systems into individual processes) uses MRT to
bridge the gap between systemic context and archaeological context by a
transformation theory that uses law-like generalizations on the relationships
between human behavior, material culture and formation processes of the
material record. When these transformations are modeled then explanations
can follow. The basic direction of MRT, is to relate theory to data as part of the
interpretive process. Middle range theory needs to be mentioned herein, as it
is a significant part of the theoretical debate in archaeology

The problem is, that there is also much confusion with MRT. It is not very
well defined. Some of the confusion results from the fact that the term came
from sociology (Raab and Goodyear 1984:256). This "confusion" factor is a
major failing, and illustrates the requirement for more precise definitions of
terminology.
The objective of MRT was to develop a strategy for integrating research
problems and data, into cumulative bodies of scientific knowledge in
which theories of a more limited scope, arrayed at different levels of
generality, could be subsumed under domains of increasingly general
principles (Raab and Goodyear 1984:255, Emphasis added).
Therein, lies the problem. It is appropriate and desirable to attempt to
"ground" inferences about past human behaviors, by developing a reliable
methodology for differentiating the effects of the behavior from other causes
of the material record. However, when that step is undertaken, the MRT's are
more likely than not, to either be principles of site formation processes, or in
some cases actual deductive macrotheories ie., "more or less generally valid
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assumptions, with axioms that are evident to everyone, and which from
logic, it comes to particular, individual conclusions." The interpretation of an
individual case comes from the top down (Egenter 1992:54).

If in fact, MRT theory is synonymous with processes of site formation, then
for our purposes, there isn't much of a problem (only with the
nomenclature). If MRT remains a part of a basic scientific, methodological
approach for the ultimate detection of patterning in human behavior, rather
than a more upper level type of theory, then okay. Formation process analysis
is a valuable part of the hierarchy of the science regarding the archaeological
record. In other words, it has value if it contributes towards providing a
footing for ... "explanations offered for the variability of the subject matter of
interest" (Raab and Goodyear 1984:263).

However, when MRT's appear to be of a more general (macro) type, then they
are of little more value than that of tacit knowledge or logic, that has been
described herein. When these MRTs are found to be generalizing,
ethnographic analogies (as used in the "bridging" process), they become
problematic because there is the basic problem of what "guides" these
analogies. Are the same principles in effect in the past, which justify the use
of ethnographic formation processes? Doesn't one create analogies and
theories by imposing their own assumptions on another's beliefs about the
world (Hodder 1991b:385)? The confusion results when questions of human
behavior leave the realm of formation processes and assume the role of
culture theory (Raab and Goodyear 1984:263). In regard to these viewpoints,
Brian Fagan makes the point rather succinctly. He states that:
Since laws, strict axiomatic structures, subsidiary assumptions,
correspondence rules, and many other theories (MRTs?) have proven
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difficult, if not impossible, to formulate in a satisfactory manner,
explicit theory building in archaeology has largely been avoided. (Fagan
1996:711, Emphasis added)
Are we then left with ambiguous theory and its consequences?

(D.) Post-modernism/Post-processualism - Welcome to the Dark Side
Realization of the theoretical, as well as the obstacles regarding data, has more
than likely help create post-modernism (ie., post-processualism in
archaeology). The subjective nature of observations has resulted in the fact
that the investigation of the material record has become relatively
unimportant to some. The "circumstances" of the failure of these described
efforts, has created "a contemporary cultural phenomena" known as post
modernism (Knapp 1996:129). To some, it is more of a "phenomena," than a
theory.

This "condition" strikes at the basic tenets of the discipline and its "threat"
has evoked strong, negative, personalized reactions by some.
The proliferation of such twaddle is perhaps comprehensible in the
narcissistic appreciation of self - a strong component of all that passes
for post modem. One can only hope that such inane, post-modernist,
reflexive, critical, post-structuralist abscesses do not affect archaeology
(Lamberg-Karlovsky, dted in Knapp 1996:127-128).
Too late, it has affected archaeology, and appears to be a logical result of the
theoretical discourses that have resulted from the inability to deal with
explanation and the material "gaps" in the archaeological record. On the
other side, A. Bernard Knapp points out on a positive note, that post
modernism has taught us that there are alternative ways of knowing,
conceiving of, and writing about the past, and that some (re)constructions of
the past though perhaps erroneous, or limited is only an acknowledgement of
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gaps in the archaeological record, our mishandling or misinterpretation of
archaeological data, or the effect of our views and bias regarding what is
significant about the data (Knapp 1996:151). This comment by Knapp
underlines the necessity for a renewed effort in creating a strong scientific
foundation in archaeology.

The skeptical post-modernists challenge modem archaeological theory and
nearly all of the key foimdational assumptions that underlie research
programs in archaeology The good news is that this "condition" may help
create a renewed emphasis on the initiation of a well crafted, scientiHc,
investigatory methodology, but the bad news is that it does not attempt to
formulate a constructive archaeological agenda. Post-modernism ..." launches
no coherent body of theory and method for interpreting the past, and sets out
deliberately to obfuscate the genuine gains made in over a century of
systematic archaeological research" (Yoffee and Sherratt 1993:8). In brief, the
claims for eliminating theory (ie., more macro-theory) are as follows:
(1) the idea of a theory implies an absolute truth that does not exist,
(2) they assume an epistemological reality that does not exist,
(3) no grounds exist for their defensible validation or substantiation,
(4) the data and truthful propositions on which they depend are at best
contextually relative,
(5) they emphasize the unity of wholes over the uniqueness of parts,
(6) they deny paradoxical situations where it is never possible to choose
one model or interpretation over the other, and
(7) they are rarely the basis for action, because they are ad hoc
justifications (Fagan 1996:712).

A suggested benefit of these issues or claims, is that they may translate into a
condition or "ethic" whereby:
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(1) post-modernism forces archaeologists to examine critically their
social, moral, and emotional involvement with the study of the past in
the present and, thus, to consider how the general public interacts with
the past:
(2) post-modernism calls into question the validity of reading all
archaeological publications as "fact sheets" and, instead, implies that
such "fact sheets" should be regarded as "expressions" of the specific
culture-historic attitudes to the past: and
(3) post-modernism encourages multiple views of the past and
promotes greater awareness of the experiences of women, nonelites,
and ethnic minorities in the past (Bintliff 1991:275-276).

Whatever one may think of these latter statements, in whole or in part, they
may also provide an impetus for reflection on archaeological direction. At the
present, ..."archaeology stands alone in its failure to insist on and build a
contextually appropriate range of social theory" (Yoffee and Sheratt 1993:8).
That is, there is a need for theories to create linkages with respect to data
collection and primary analysis of data, and the process of explanation. These
issues and considerations, may help generate meaning by an tinderstanding
or explanation of the record that perhaps could not be anticipated even by
archaeologists themselves. It may temper and focus archaeology somewhat,
so as not to be viewed as merely playing with time frames, encountering the
record, consxmiing nostalgia for bygone eras, or just viewing progress (Bruner
1994:398).

The Next Step: The concern has been raised, that these matters of
..."experience, predilections, prejudices" and so on, are formidable and
subjective properties that influence the discipline in a negative manner
(Renfrew and Bahn 1991:14). With this "plight" of, and the influence of these
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theoretical discourses, how can we then be expected to obtain the objective
empirical data? As indicated, the answer may be found by developing and
emphasizing more independently verifiable research on the basis of generally
accepted archaeologically relevant and objective scientific principles. These
objectives will most likely be achieved by those individuals who are "close to
the field." That is, those who see the need for these new guidelines and
understand that in the present economies the luxury of the more abstract
theorists, ie., those ridiculed as the "theory heads," do not lead the discipline
to irrelevance. The more verifiable and credible the research is constructed,
the more the answers are not predetermined by these observers, theoreticians,
scholars, archaeologists, or whomever, the more relevant archaeology may
become. Hopefully, we can do so without creating rigid archaeological
"dogma."

It would be a significant step, if archaeological energies were directed towards
having archaeologists of a wide variety of persuasions, develop these
methodological systems necessary to interpret finds in similar terms of beliefs
that they find secure (Cowgill 1993:554). This does not mean that archaeology
shouldn't look (ie., explanations) at the past from multiple perspectives (ie.,
pursuing multivocality): it should (Knapp 1996:127). The priority that is
sought after, is with respect to the progression of an "agreed upon"
scientifically based procedures (no manner how problematic it sounds). At a
minimum, the development of acceptable definitions would be desirable,
after all this is a discipline where the participants can't seem to agree on when
to use a "hyphen."
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Part III - A Return to an Emphasis on a Scientific Methodology Back to the Future
(A.) The Text
The limits of archaeological knowledge is one of the degree and quality of of
predictability of past cultural behavior, this is a matter for archaeological
research, not a priori declarations. The explanations we seek,
... must be pursued by an objective investigation of the observable data
of archaeology; objective investigation of observable data is simply
scientific research; and the desired outcome of archaeological research
is scientific explanation of the archaeological data (Bamforth and
Spaulding 1982:184).
It always come back to the "data" in context. The data are all we have, and at a
minimum provides us the opportunity to identify and give more or less
adequate descriptions of culture types and at least their placement in time
(Spaulding 1988:267). The archaeologist collects the data by exploratory
research, formulates hypothesis (a proposition or explanation to account for
the data) tests the hypothesis against more data, then may ..."use theoretical
models to identify relevant variables" (eg., confirmation methods) to best
summarize the pattern observed in the data and then evaluate the
significance of the findings. Once confirmatory or falsifying results are
obtained the process begins again (Kuznar 1997:46-48).

The observable data is gathered perhaps in order to attempt to recognize
patterns, that might eventually serve as a foundation for theoretical
explanations. The researcher is guided by his or her own expectations during
this process, thus making choices in what data to prioritize. Different
researchers may differ in the readings of the same data, and different
historical and cultural conditions may allow for different interpretations of
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this material "text" (a metaphor of the material record-as-text) (Fagan
1996:578). The proposed design of archaeological methodology, is to provide
the circumstances or the "techniques," whereby the record of the material
data can be developed scientifically and "uniformly." For what purpose(s) the
text is established (as we may end up with multiple meanings) is not the
initial goal.

On one level, archaeology is a theoretical discipline concerned with rather
abstract assumptions, abstract in the sense that they cannot be demonstrated
to be true or false. For example, ..." since all human behavior is social
behavior, the primary task of archaeology must be the interpretive
understanding of past understandings" (Fagan 1996:711). At this level it is
more about the development of research programs and their fundamental
assumptions. The level of theory that is the focus here is how to shift an
emphasis to the more narrower theories of explanation of archaeological
facts, one which is explicitly scientific. Therefore, the challenge facing
archaeology today is methodological, not theoretical, because without
productive methodologies it will be diffictilt at best to build a body of
archaeological theory (Sabloff, Binford and McAnany 1987:208).

Ideally, the theoretical part of the discipline would first come to terms with
the fact, that because there is as yet not a sufficient foimdation (ie., "suspect"
empirical data), what we can use to validate (at least relatively speaking) our
views of the past? Even though we have roughly a hundred years or so of
data, these "data" were most likely, and in many cases, gathered with the
influences and biases referred to hereinbefore. Are the archaeologists of today
who are working in the field satisfied that the acquisition of data over the past
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century meets their scientific standards and their generally accepted
standards?

Since all we have are data, the emphasis on the theoretical dialogue would
need to shift towards the appropriate uniform methodological efforts that
will be necessary to obtain the elusive "text" of the data. Optimistically, the
"validation" would come from a broader based acceptance of agreed upon
procedures of empirical research. As general, macro-theoretical schools are
de-emphasized and play less of a directional role, the concentration would
ideally be more on approaching projects with specific problems (with or
without hypotheses in mind), and not "agenda" riddled dialogues. While
seeking explanations without agendas, there is a greater possibility that one
may be more receptive to those initially inductively derived explanations.
Again, that is not to say that in reality the explanatory research process is
never purely inductive or deductive, just as it is not purely confirmatory or
refutational, a cycle of these processes is involved (Kuznar 1997:45). However,
in a general directional sense, inductivity is the desired initial scientific
emphasis that is being proposed.

Methodology that is not rooted in more "abstract" macro-theoretical
paradigms, but instead in the level of scientific theory and the explanation of
facts, and in (1) as precise, defined, objective, universally understood, and
accepted empirical data, as is realistically possible, and (2) becomes more
systematic, using uncompromising logic and more sophisticated, quantitative
techniques, will result in more pragmatic and responsible (in validating)
work in the field (Thomas 1990:54).
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This framework is suggested as the primary means by which the data
collecting requirements of the practicing archaeologist are to be directed. This
criteria is necessary for establishing and defining cultural and/ or physical
"components," and explaining components based on relationships and
context with other phenomena. Then, ranges of variation and the
interrelationship of causal variables will be sought that determined its (the
"components") present form (Watson, Le Blanc and Redman 1984:68-69). The
core motive remains relatively basic ie., to provide a means or method of
distinguishing between more and less evidence for the validity of some
hypothesis (Spaulding 1988:264).

In support of these proposals, most theorists including the processualists,
seem to agree with the statement of Ian Hodder when he says that ..."the
major stumbling block" in current archaeology is methodological (Hodder
1991:94). Responsible archaeology demands observational evidence as tests for
theories about the past (Kosso 1991:626). Unless the methods of data discovery
and analysis are coherent and uniform, how can one hope to contemplate its
meaning.

Additional justifications for the accentuation of basic research are fairly
obvious: (a) the "history" of humankind is over three million years old, and
(b) for more than ninety-nine percent of that tremendous span of time,
archaeology is the only significant source of cultural information (Renfrew
1991.10). Though it is understandable (ie., the "need to know"), it seems
presumptuous that theory making has played such a huge role in such a
relatively recent discipline. When one considers the vastness of both the
known and certainly the potential record, it becomes even harder to
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understand. The lesson is, that there should be more of an engagement with
scientific procedures, instead of using assumptions, made from unsupported
analogies as explanations (Sabloff 1994:62).

(B.) A Scientific Inductive Approach
The successful introduction of propositions into an overall inductive
approach requires that two features be sustainable: (a) the propositions are
accurate, and (b) they are relevant to the materials being interpreted (even if
done deductively on a lower theoretical scale). Evaluations are made with
regard to the above possibilities before the strength of the inductive argument
can be judged. It is the strength of such arguments that determines the
accuracy of the past we "infer" from our observations (Binford 1989b:58). The
result is that there is the possibility of objective confirmations (to a greater or
lesser degree, of course) of hypotheses (Spaulding 1988:269). One could view
these forgoing statements as a call for establishing "micro-theories" of
explanation. Though these present objectives may be looked upon as
rudimentary, even boring to some, eventually this structure may result in
even more interesting concepts of substantive theory .

The American Heritage Dictionary defines an hypothesis as, "A tentative
explanation that accounts for a set of facts and can be tested by further
investigation; a (type of) theory." These are unconfirmed, but testable
propositions (ie., suggested for acceptance). The product of the explanation is a
covering law model (confirmation method) that attempts to analyze and
describe. When invoked for explanatory purposes, the hypothesis must be
capable of test by reference to publicly ascertainable evidence. Acceptance is
always subject to the proviso, that the hypotheses may have to be abandoned.
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if adverse evidence or more adequate hypotheses should be found. What is
the nature of the explanations empirical science can provide? What
understanding of the empirical phenomena do they convey (Bamforth and
Spaulding 1982:185)? It is a continual processes ie., to keep working the
hypothesis over

With a return to a concentration or emphasis on scientific archaeology, we
can first define past entities with generally acceptable certainties, as inferred
from material remains. The form of hypotheses about such past entities
would be more or less,
... in terms of the interrelationships of explicitly and carefully defined
variables, draw(ing) out the material implications of these
interrelationships, and examin(ing) the data in an objective and
systematic manner to discover to what degree the hypothesized
interrelationships are confirmed or refuted by objective examination
(Bamforth and Spaulding 1982:194).
Of course, an "objective examination" is an ideal to work for, not an absolute.
"Postmodernists and critical theorists allege that neither the experience nor
the interpretive activity of the scientific researcher can be considered
innocent" That is, all facts of the past are theory laden, thus if there is no
value free science, objectivity is impossible (Kuznar 1997:17&163). However,
... despite influences from personal and cultural biases upon theories,
methods , and actual work, these influences are never so all
consuming that archaeologists find exactly what they theorize ... The
scientific method does not predetermine what archaeologists discover;
the scientific method can be used to challenge existing knowledge; the
scientific method systematically leads to change and is therefore a
method of change, not a method of stasis (Kuznar 1997:170).
Archaeological hypotheses, like those of any other discipline, are the results
of attempts to explain particular observations or classes of observations, and
possibly lead to descriptions of potentially law-like relationships, or patterns
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(see Renfrew 1991.10 and Watson, Le Blanc and Redman 1984:45). The
techniques and procedures that are implicit and make up the focus of this
discussion include, but are not limited to items such as: radiocarbon dating,
formation or transformation processes, computer modeling and simulation,
problem oriented artifact typologies, explicit sampling designs for survey and
excavation, advances in sampling techniques in order to recognize patterns
(eg., quantitative, statistical sampling techniques to control "bias"),
palynology, flotation analysis, and more. Though perhaps identified as more
"middle range," taphonomy, ethnoarchaeology and experimental archaeology
would also fall into this technique category (Fagan 1996:581). These techniques
are an identifiable part of the science of archaeology that may lead to more
credible explanations.

In the end, the objective is not to seek "ultimate" explanations or the socalled "fast past," but rather a sound and accepted "array of interpretive"
approaches that provide better understandings of these past scientifically
grounded environments, social processes, cognition and human agency
(Knapp 1996:129). The more deductive types of higher level general theory
making, would end up with a lessor role in directing these approaches of
explanation.

Part IV - Anthropological Studies of Architecture
(A.) Explaining the Architectural Material Record - The Scope of the Data
The relationship of anthropology and architecture has never been made very
explicit. If it is called "Architectural Anthropology," then it suggests that it is
an anthropological look at architecture, and in reverse, architectural theorists
intend to carry out research into anthropology from the view point of
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architecture (Egenter 1992:21).

The American Heritage Dictionary defines architecture, in part as ..."The art
and science of designing and erecting buildings." However, for our specific
purposes, the definition that architecture ..."is typically defined to encompass
the built forms [hereinafter, the "Built Form(s)"], often monumental,
characteristic of civilizations and self-consciously designed and built by
specialists," is somewhat more useful (Lawrence and Low 1990:454).

However, it is necessary to define this concept a bit further. In its broadest
sense it is "constructive human behavior," which is reconstructed
systematically, not historically, and therefore includes anthropology (Egenter
1992:11). Therefore, in any archaeological analysis, architecture should
include not only the Built Forms arid parts thereof, but the artifacts and
ecology associated therewith. In addition. Built Forms are also more than
dwellings, temples or meeting houses. They are spaces that are defined and
bounded eg., plazas, streets, and courtyards (Lawrence and Low 1990:454).
Even in large complex sites such as that of the Maya, the Built Form
necessarily includes vernacular or traditional structures as a part of the
general human phenomena being examined. It is also appropriate to include
them, because of the interconnected aspects of these differing types of Built
Forms. Factors dictating the design of the vernacular have application to the
climate, topography, available materials, level of technology, economic
resources, functions and cultural conventions (Kalogirou 1992:764). Those
same considerations apply to varying degrees to monumental architecture.
Monumental architecture is associated with all complex societies around the
world. It includes large houses, public buildings, and special purpose
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structures.
Its principal defining feature is that its scale and elaboration exceed the
requirements of any practical functions that a building is intended to
perform (Trigger 1990:119).
The relationships of the Built Forms are found to vary in extent, as a result of
their connection to concepts of accommodation, adaptation, expression,
representation, production, and reproduction (Lawrence and Low 1990:454).
These interactive relationships, also reveal how people create and are
influenced by the built environment. As a result, the architectural
complexities of the Built Forms are not looked at in isolation, but in the
context of the entire site (the "text," as are particularly defined). This is due to
the fact, that the architecture, culture, and environment are interrelated,
interwoven, and integrated. As a result, each element invariably
complements the other. This research has to take all these factors into account
(Turan 1996:355).

The issues of various relationships may be evidenced by differing data. These
variations suggest a justification for the scientifically based, inductive
methodologies. It is not appropriate to even begin to derive macro-theory at
this stage, but instead to develop explanatory "hypotheses" (as hereinbefore
defined). The objective is to lead to more well founded explanations of the
nature or structure of relationships of the Maya from multiple perspectives.
This process may even lead to higher level theories eg., the ideologies of
society, collective ritual and symbolic meanings (Turan 1996:356). Question
whether for the purposes of a scientific methodology, it is preferable to first
fully develop the material record or arrive on the scene with a theory you are
attempting to prove or disprove with incomplete data. Of course, one has
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assumptions or a direction about what he or she hopes to find or a focus of
inquiry, but this is different from using macrotheory which may "prescribe"
expected results. Keeping in mind the goal is to create objective results from
the data. There are examples in research where the evidence is interpreted in
a certain "light," which is exactly what the post-modernist protest.

Therefore, the "inductive-type" objective is to scientifically summarize the
objective data (eliminating alternative versions of the past) before attempting
to explain the subject phenomena. The point is to define your "text from
context," and then derive your explanations. That is, to (1) systematically set
forth data in proper order by agreed upon standards in the discipline, and
then to do the same, when appropriate, with relevant (2) micro, and (3) if
possible, macrotheories (Fagan 1996:581). By first establishing rigorous
methodologies within a scientific epistemology, and then if desirable to
critically select and derive theories for explanation eg., structures of
organization and trajectories of change (Yoffee and Sheratt 1993:8).

One concern that underlies these suggestions is that it may help alleviate the
desire for a "fast past" with the accompanying acrimony that results from
incomplete and/ or inconclusive data. In comparison with the unknown
potential of the archaeological record, the amount of scientific archaeological
research that has been done to date, that would meet whatever "standards" of
the discipline presently exist, would most likely be, but a "dot" on the
horizon.

The fact, that human activities are in some sense unpredictable and complex,
and therefore data interpretation and/or theory becomes more problematical.
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does not mean that we shouldn't attempt to develop this suggested structure
of investigation. "The aim is to confront the question of meaning, not
meaning in a passive, structural sense, but meaning in an active, experiential
sense" (Beaudry 1991:241, Emphasis added). That is, structured, experienced
field work, not intuitively.

(B.) Architectural Theory
The term architectural theory might suggest to some,
... a scientific domain which deals concisely and theoretically with
architecture ... that it approaches this field of objects scientifically, and
that its main purpose would consist in providing reliable theoretical
foundations for architecture ... Far from it (Egenter 1992:37).
Architectural theory has been narrowed into a microtheoretical angle with an
emphasis on modern periods of architecture and limited to a conventional
written history of architecture.

As a result, existing architectural theories are not particularly useful for
anthropological purposes, and they are also generally much older than
modern analytical epistemologies. Architects tend to view these theories as
normative, compositional design knowledge in terms such as, the "theory of
art" (Egenter 1992:37,39,43). In this context, theory consists of contextual
marginal knowledge for architectural production processes, which are mostly
historic in nature with particular artistic, ideological and philosophical
values. "In essence, they contain scarcely any analytical, but rather form
integrating components" (Gleichmann 1992:27-28). However, architectural
theory is interdisciplinary in nature. Research has been integrated from
various fields including economics, anthropology, environmental
psychology, prehistoric and classical archaeology.
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(C.) Problematic Interpretive Approaches of the Built Form
Investigations into anthropological architectural explanations differ
depending on what type of researcher (social anthropologist, architect,
archaeologists etc.) is doing the investigation. That is, some might research
the Built Form primarily by design and construction technology adapted to
climatic conditions, and others might emphasize how Built Forms
accommodated social groups, and are integrated into the cultural whole or a
myriad of other directions (Lawrence and Low 1990:458). These differences
become evident in the following descriptions which are primarily taken from
an article by Denise L. Lawrence and Setha M. Low (Lawrence and Low 1990).
The descriptions help in providing additional justification for placing an
emphasis on a uniform, scientific methodology.

(i.) Early Culture Theory: With the earlier theoretical approaches, the built
environment was seen as a manifestation of culture. The Built Form was
integrated into a complex of traits that allowed a group to adapt and maintain
itself within the natural environment, and mirrored those same cultures.
(Built Forms and human behavior accommodated, expressed and reinforced
each other.)

Amos Rapoport, a professor of architecture and anthropology, building
somewhat on the work of the broadly functionalist's school of thought (ie.,
integration of ecology, social organization, and symbolic factors) theorized
that, ..."built forms are primarily influenced by sociocultural factors modified
by architectural responses both to climatic conditions and to limitations of
materials and methods" (Lawrence and Low 1990:456-458). So what is it that
we leam from these early research efforts? Perhaps no more than there are
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multiple social, cultural, as well as ecological factors affecting the Built Form.

(ii.) Social Organization: Further research relating to interactions of the built
environment with social organizations and spatial behavior have also
contributed at least to the theoretical aspects of the Built Form. An example of
this approach regarding relations of the sodal "fit," is expressed in the model
of what is called "ecological psychology, " that is ... "human groups seek to
adapt their buildings to their behavioral needs or functional requirements;
when the built environment ceases to accommodate behavioral
requirements, people seek to correct the problem through construction,
renovation, or moving to a different building. Conversely, people also
change their behavior to fit the physical environment, especially when it
presents limitations" (Lawrence and Low 1990:460). (Therefore, we leam that
if a person's behavior is that of being accustom to sitting in a chair, he/she
will tend to look for a chair big enough to sit in, and if they can't construct or
renovate one to fit, then they might move to sit in another one.) For the most
part this area is distinguished by the lack of concrete data.

Ethnoarchaeologists have looked at the physical attributes of dwelling plans,
construction materials, technology, and activity areas as reflective patterns of
social behavior to spatial organization. Again, it is an attempt to understand a
concept of "fit" between built forms and social organization. Therefore, the
use of space, as a matter of cultural organization, determines architectural
form. Generally stated the design of Built Forms are the product of social
processes. Is this a theory where society makes rationale choices for that
particular society? How valuable is that? Are they meaningful, explanatory
theories, or are they merely general notions of cognition?
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(iii.) Symbolic: More symbolic type approaches interpret the built
environment as an expression of culturally shared mental structures and
processes. What do Built Forms mean and how do they express meaning?
(Expressions of social and political structures in the built environment) An
example, would be the use of metaphor to explore the built environment as
having a "symbolically encoded cultural meaning system" ie., cultural
expression. Thus, the Built Form is a vehicle for expressing and
communicating cultural meaning. This may be similar to saying that,
... buildings essentially structure human environmental space ... man
not only perceives, but integrates the spatial structure defined by
buildings and reproduces this structure in other contexts (thinks with
it. and works with it) (Egenter 1990:81, Emphasis added).
If this is the case the spatial structure influences society and lives within our
language, our thoughts, keeps the arts living and even supports our
metaphysical ideas, then we can reconstruct our cultural history on the basis
of the objects of architecture. Thus, the Built Forms would likely be an
"expression of culturally shared mental structures and process." In any event,
the use of metaphor, appears to be one of the more popular interpretive
approaches to date.

(iv.) Psychological: In addition, there are the psychological approaches of
integrating the concept of culture into explorations of the spatial dimensions
of human behavior and human interaction with the built environment.
These approaches are individual mental processes and mechanisms, that
provide explanations of behavior and meaning, and which focus on concepts
of self and the "spatial" dimensions of human non-verbal behavior,
cognition and language aspect of human interactions with the environment
(Lawrence and Low 1990:476). This process is difficult for historic explanation.
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and exceedingly complex for explanation of the prehistoric Built Forms. That
is, the past is not directly accessible and ..."the dead cannot come back and tell
archaeologists that they are wrong" (Kuznar 1997:162). These approaches
could be critically viewed as attempts to create the past, rather than
understand the past as this approach appears likely to be more theory laden.
This would probably be an approach that Ian Hodder might see as ripe for
creating the past subjectively in the present.

(v.) Social Production: When we review theories of social production of the
Built Form, there is an apparent concentration on the social, political, and
economic forces that produce the built environment and conversely, the
impact of the socially produced built environment on social action. Anthony
D. King's social history theory states, that
Buildings result from social needs and accommodate a variety of
functions - economic, social, political, religious and cultural. Their size,
appearance, location and forms are governed not simply by physical
factors (climate, materials or topography), but by societies ideas, its
forms of economic and social organization, its distribution of resources
and authority, its activities and the beliefs and values which prevail at
any one period of time (Lawrence and Low 1990:483).
Though this social production theory is quite logical, query as to how helpful,
or valuable this or any of these theories are in pursuing explanation from the
empirical data. How do they give practical guidelines and direction to field
work? If we are to proceed in a scientifically inductive manner by necessity we
look first towards a precise definition of the object field to be theoretically
researched.
No a prioris are imported from the outside, there is no longer any
deduction from aesthetic a prioris; symbolic or cosmological findings
are no longer explained from the standpoints of the history of
religions. Instead the defined objects, described empirically are
documented by criteria immanent to architecture, such as the materials
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used, types of construction, resulting form, spatial and
temporal conditions, social relations etc (Egenter 1990:81).
An "objective" analysis will therefore form the basis of such theoretical
procedures eg., assumptions, generalizations, and working hypotheses.

(vi.) Additional Propositions: Further examples of problematic approaches are
also illustrated in an article by Randall McGuire and Michael Schiffer, who
attempt to create a framework for the examination of cross-cultural
regularities in social organization and Built Forms.
(1) A particular design is viewed as the outcome of a process of
compromise among conflicting goals, influenced by factors of
adaptation and social organization.
(2) Of course, availability of materials and technology constrain
architectural designs.
(3) Architectural design, we suggest, involves the give and take of
social interaction that occurs against a backdrop of environmental and
social processes.
(4) The design process can be viewed as a series of compromises
between goals, the result of which is necessarily the achievement of
some goals at less than a maximum level (McGuire and Schiffer
1983:277-297).
The premise of the McGuire and Schiffer article which incorporates these
statements, is that of offering clarification to middle range theory, a linking
up of large-scale adaptive processes to the characteristics of specific artifacts,
and in this instance "architecture." In the same breath, they say it may
contribute to high-level theory Their goal is to explain in behavioral terms,
variability and change in material culture. How are these more generalized
theories specifically archaeologically testable?

After reviewing these "additional propositions" and those that preceded, a
critic might be tempted to dismiss these propositions as a form of ...
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"universal laws about human behavior that are very either trivial, or
untrue" (Renfrew and Bahn 1991:416). In any event, (and in fairness) it is
important to remember that the Built Form is but one focal point of the
personal and social identities in the cultures being studied, and cannot be
understood apart from keeping these social and economic forces in mind.

(D.) Anthropological Architectural Methodology
Generalizations and deductive testing against the material record is not the
only, nor in the larger sense are they necessarily the most productive ways to
ensure the objectivity and the "validity" of explanations about the past. What
is being proposed however, is a move from what is seen as a primarily
deductive to a more "inductive" type of methodology, in what is seen as a
more realistic step to gain uniformly obtained hypotheses. Inductive
procedure implies precise definition of the object fields which are to be
researched.

One begins with scientific observations of the material phenomena, using
well defined terms (the precise language of observation) as an essential part of
the verification process, and then moves to the explanatory framework eg.,
the assxmiptions, and formulation of working hypotheses that are to be
confirmed or rejected in the field ("falsification" being a goal). The process
begins inductively with exploratory research, then with a proposed scientific
problem a theory is proposed that is logical, empirical, and causal. At some
point, no matter what methodological principles the researcher favors, at
some point after inductively creating new theories (ie., not starting
deductively with macrotheory) follows a deducing of testable hypotheses,
testing, and falsification/corroboration and then the cycle continues. It has to
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continue, since it has been pointed out that scientists make no claim to
ultimate truths (Kuznar:1997:48).

This is a repetitive, self-critical and endless process. It would continue until a
reasonable judgment is made that the data base is exhausted. The technique
consists of a "give and take" from inferring implications, and from the
empirical data creating the questions, assumptions or tentative explanations.

Part V - The Methodology Using Classic Mava Architecture
The spatial dimensions of human behavior, we are concerned with in this
case are the remnants or tangible remains of the monumental architecture of
the lowland Maya. The Maya created one of the most complex cultural
systems in the Americas. During the first and second millennia A.D., Mayanspeaking people occupied the southern states of Mexico (Chiapas, Campeche,
Yucatarv and Quintana Roo) and also the coimtries of Belize, Guatemala, El
Salvador, and the western portion of Honduras. During the Late Formative
Period (400 B.C. to A.D. 250) the building of monumental structures
(pyramids, ball coxirts, and large building platforms) as well as sprawling
residential compounds commenced. (Pagan 1996:406).

Naturally the architecture of the Maya was the early focus of observations and
interpretations.
Prom the onset of the 'discovery' of the Maya centers, architecture was
the most immediate and conspicuous form of evidence of the
complexity, power, and splendor of the Maya civilization (Abrams
1994:2).
The fact that these ruins were set in a tropical environment added to the
sense of accomplishment of the Maya, The interpretations of the architecture
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were often based upon the subjective assessment of its scale and quality.
Assertions that they had achieved a level of complexity which has been
associated with "civilization," has been attributed to the measure and size of
their architecture (Abrams 1994:4). Because the interpretations of the Maya
have been traditionally (or historically) based on more subjective
assessments, it is now appropriate to consider the empirical, quantitative
studies of the architectural scale of the Maya structures.

Why study the Maya at all? Because we have a need to know what came
before ie., to satisfy the craving of our understanding of the past. Why do we
have this need? Perhaps that is best answered by psychologists or
philosophers. Carl Hempel believes that explanations of the past enable
successful predictions and, ultimately, the establishment of laws about the
subject matter in question. Richard Watson points out, that
General laws in archaeology that concern cultural processes can be used
to describe, explain, and predict cultural differences and similarities
represented in the archaeological record, and thus to further the
ultimate goal of anthropology, which is the description, explanation,
and prediction of cultural differences and similarities in the present
(Richard Watson, cited in Kuznar 1997:31).
Before the research into explanation begins, there needs to be questions.
Questions from the general to the more specific can arise not only from
theory, but from observations. For example, and in no particular order,
format or categorization, are the following:
(1) Why do these forms differ?
(2) What is the nature of the differences and what kind of social and cultural
features are responsible?
(3) Do the formal aspects of the built form reflect the variable ways the
structures may have been used?
(4) Is the use of the form exclusive to its purported purpose(s) (Smyth, Dove,
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and Dunning 1995:321)?
(5) Is one able to understand variations of behavior by stud)Aing built forms?
(6) Does it constitute a part of that societies' cultural reality?
(7) Is one able to study the long term effect of these moniraients and/or the
active role of this aspect of material culture in providing explanations of a
broader nature (Adams and Jones 1981:302)?
(8) Do buildings essentially structure human environmental space
(Egenter 1990:81)?

The function of questions is to hopefully give some direction, without the
imposition of prior interpretation or prejudicial direction. The problematic
nature of any investigation into architectural artifacts is apparent from a
review of these lists. They illustrate the difficulty of working with
"premature" macro theoretical constructions. At the same time, the questions
on this list seem to "blend" into each other, and for the most part all seem to
highlight the concerns over the use, change or evolution of the Built Form.
These inquiries make one realize the complexities of the possible answers,
that one cannot even begin to address with any degree of certainty, until the
tangible remains of the Built Forms are coherently and systematically
described and defined (Adams and Jones 1981:302).

(A.) Specific Maya Architectural Inquiry
There have been few tropical forest cultures in the world that have produced
monumental architecture.
Among those that have, the civilizations of the Khmer in Southeast
Asia between about AD 850 and 1300, and the Classic Maya in Central
America between AD 250 and 900 are the most remarked and
remarkable (Hammond and Gerhardt 1990:461).
The Classic Maya monumental architecture has roots in the Formative
(Preclassic) period of the tropical lowlands. Monumental constructions appear
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by the second century BC at the latest, and perhaps two or three centuries
earlier.

Though they were likely aware of nucleated urban organization in highland
Mexico and therefore the greater advantages of population centralization for
social control, they opted for a more dispersed settlement design. It is
believed, that somehow
The Maya developed a dispersed pattern of civic and household
clusters which allowed the control and regulation of state institutions
(Scarborough and Robertson 1986:174).
Though some previously argued that because the Maya lacked true cities and
permanent urban populations, that therefore they were without true
bureaucratic state organization. However, the mass of data indicates a high
order of urban-level activities in Maya centers, as derived from Maya texts
setting forth d)mastic histories, social and marriage alliances, conquests and
tributary relationships. Thus, such control and regulation is very probable.
Perhaps, one needs to distinguish between urban and state organizations
(Adams and Jones 1981:301).

In the case of the Maya, the Built Forms change during the course of their
civilization as they appear to have changed their ritual orientation, their
protective or symbolic functions, and their use of public vs. private space at
various in time, (Scarborough and Robertson 1986:174 and Gleichmann
1992:29). Unlike Chartres which remained a single purpose structure
throughout its existence. Built Forms with these more substantive changes of
use, and add considerably to the difficulties encountered by the researcher.

Traditionally, scholars have been somewhat loose in their labeling of
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monumental Built Forms. The Maya centers have been defined by a limited
number of of functional classes of major architecture. Palace structures and
temples are two classes of the Built Form, that are highly variable in style
from region to region.
The two together probably make up 90% or more of the total public
architectural mass of any given dty. The rest of large-scale Maya
construction is made up of a multitude of functional classes, including
ball game courts, reservoirs, fortifications, and internal road nets.
These classes all exclude the vast acreages of paved stirfaces which
served as bases for superstructures (Adams and Jones 1981:303).
The palace structures have been found to generally be multiple-use buildings
which contain an5rwhere from 4 to over 50 rooms. Uses encompass elite-class
residences, administrative offices, places of religious retreat, storage areas for
valuables and commodities, and as locations for aristocratic court protocol.
Temples are often erected on tall platforms, have three rooms or less, and are
frequently the locations of burials of distinguished members of Classic Maya
society, who are often times rulers (Adams 1981:303). However, though these
individual buildings may be plarmed, "The overall direction of architectural
development or of urbanization has not been 'plarmed' by anyone"
(Gleichmann 1992:27).

(B.) Examples of Systematic Methodology - Hypothesis Testing:
It is inefficient to excavate with no plan or problem in mind to which data
might contribute as a solution. You must have some direction or purpose.
We usually know enough from observations and the gathering of data
(pattern-recognition or exploratory research to pose hypotheses,
... for which digging can in principle provide tests, but are open to
altering hypotheses, problems, and procedures if the explanation does
not provide data for the precise testing of just these hypotheses with
which we have begun (Watson, Le Blanc and Redman 1984:53).
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We therefore move from an objective section of the real world, to objective
or the precise language of observation, which translates the basic field of
objects into a clearly represented basic part of lower empirical theory, and
then these hypotheses lead to higher level theory (Egenter 1990:69).

Analysis of monumental architecture has been done traditionally in several
ways;
(1) stylistically, to reflect morphological discontinuities of design elements
and changing cultural conditions
(2) energetically, to reconstruct labor inputs, elite power structures, and status
and wealth differentials
(3) behaviorally, to link specific architectural features to adjacent activity areas
(Smyth, Dove, and Dunning 1995:322).

There is the basic problem of architectural variation and how it relates to site
organization. These problems seem to be largely the result of (a.) inadequate
field sampling (sampling must be undertaken at all settings within
settlements, not just those of architectural material typically foimd in Mayan
centers, as 60% to 80% of settlement areas have no architecture), and (b.) a lack
of community dynamics (which follows if there is poor or inadequate field
work being done). The specific problem and the point is, that the "formal
characteristics of the architecture" are not always good indications of their
function" (Smyth, Dove, and Dunning 1995:322). That is, form and function is
complex, and subject to considerable variation.

The following research projects are examples of the more positive aspects of
scientific procedures. They demonstrate the creation of "hypotheses" in order
to meet that researcher's particular goal. This is the level of effort that
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archaeology should be concerned with in light of the vast and incomplete
nature of the data. At the same time, the techniques that are employed will
also help direct our attention to the problems and results of those procedures
that may be somewhat more "shaky." These field examples are in a sense
randomly chosen, as they are not necessarily all "connected" in their specific
subject manner

Example One - Sayil: There was a large scale, intensive surface survey at
Terminal Classic Sayil in the Yucatan, Mexico. The techniques at this project
emphasized the dynamic properties of past Maya settlement systems, and
how they relate to architectural interpretations (Smyth, Dove, and Dunning
1995:321).
The site work, which involved surface and soil patterns, revealed certain
intangibles of the site.
In assessing aspects of prehispanic Maya community organization, this
study shows that settlement pattern studies must be conducted at a
larger scale and with greater intensity than has commonly been
practiced in Lowland Maya settlement archaeology (Smyth, Dove, and
Dunning 1995:321).
These conclusions were drawn by the researchers by building upon a large
architectural database, all site settings independent of architectural feature
location were systematically sampled. The survey data were used to assess the
concentric zonation model (CZM) which describes Maya community
organization as having elite residences decline proportionately from the
center of the site.

The studies started with (a.) intensive mapping of the monumental
architecture (eg., ground plans, room numbers, wall construction, roof types
etc.), and (b.) a systematic surface survey. A systematic interval strategy was
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employed to intensively sample nearly 3.5 sq. km. of Sayil's urban settlement
zone that had been previously mapped.) Most of the 3.5 sq. km. were surface
collected, each with 16 individual 3m by 3m collection units at regular 25m
intervals, and soil testing (Smyth, Dove, and Dunning 1995:328). Two
principle approaches employed in inferring agricultural practices from soil
studies have been mapping and the analysis of soil phosphates. (Phosphate
analysis has value, due to the fact that many human activities, including the
production and processing of food, result in significant depletions or
concentrations of soil phosphates.) All surface materials were analyzed using
typological classifications and counted and weighed as added controls. This
analysis focused on the frequencies, percentages, and distributions of major
ceramic wares, vessel form assemblages, and soils and their architectural
associations across the site (Smyth, Dove, and Dunning 1995:324-331).

The Sayil project demonstrated problems regarding the data base. If you are
looking only at the architectural remains themselves, you have limited
yourself right off the bat. For example, the associated feature clusters around
the zone(s) of monumental architecture relate the rest of the story. This
project also illustrated the basics of intensive, systematic collection and
analysis of artifacts (eg., high-status, and utilitarian artifacts) and ecofacts.
Their efforts included the creation of accurate contour density plots by total
frequency which showed spatial distribution (of these wares into broad
functional categories), and architectural features (with distribution plotted
against the architecture) across the site. This project illustrates a direction
towards the establishment of appropriate scientific procedures that are
required for complete data production.
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The larger spatial context of architectural remains (groups of building types
and other architectural features) and their artifact/ ecofact associations
provided a key for reconstructing social status and activity differentiation at
Sayil. However, it is only apart of the system of analysis. Questions of
behavioral variation require total site approaches; representative sampling
strategies, and new classes of information. Interestingly, the researchers at
Sayil conclude that.
Contrary to archaeological assumption, there appears to be no direct
correlation between large monumental architecture and residential
patterns indicative of elites (Smyth, Dove, and Dunning 1995:341).
This thesis would require, the relativist addition of the words ..."at Sayil," at
the end of that sentence. [However, the authors do say later on that ..."there is
considerable variability in site organization at Sayil, and presumably at many
other Maya centers" (Smyth, Dove, and Dunning 1995: 342).] In order to better
understand the social correlates of central, monumental architecture requires
a change in research perspective (other than CZM) to include more in-depth
examination of all settlement contexts, especially peripheral areas of
settlement that played such a key role in the dynamics of Maya urbanism.

The researchers make the point in closing, that the additional challenge
facing archeology is the systematic linkage of tangibles to intangibles, the
establishment of bridging arguments (Smyth, Dove, and Dunning 1995:342).
They suggest that in reconstructing the range of activities in Mayan centers
may be a key to these bridging arguments which can be used to help explain
prehistoric settlement patterns.

At Sayil there was a use of ceramic data to demonstrate, that Built Forms are
not necessarily a direct expression of building function or the social status of
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may then count the courtyards of major architecture (as the basic measure of
center importance) in order to obtain quantitative assessments of paved areas
and associated architectural masses. (The resulting patterns seem to reflect
political, economic, and demographic hierarchies.) It is then possible to come
up with numerical assessments and hierarchical rankings (rank-ordering) of
Maya cities. Adams and Jones point out that due to know^n sampling defects it
is hazardous to rank order-data, it is important thus to keep in mind that one
should not accept these assessments as conclusive (Adams and Jones
1981:315). They believe that what is important is the demonstration of the
validity of the analytical process in generating patterns and hypotheses, even
if the explanations are later proven too be in error.

The reason this research is mentioned, is due to the observations that: (1) a
long standing problem in Maya archaeology had been the definition of the
nature of Maya Lowland sites. "No current assessment of Maya Lowland
urbanism is based on direct and objective methodology," and (2) the concern,
that scholars had somewhat casually viewed the large aggregates of
monumental architecture of the Maya Lowlands, and that this ambivalence
was reflected in the labels they attached to these aggregate ceremonial centers,
civic centers, centers (Adams and Jones 1981:301-303). These failings, and the
fact that spatial patterning is less conclusive, underlined the concern for
uniform procedures by those in the field. The authors point out in their
conclusion that there is a need for more and better data.

Example Three - Uaxactun and Tikal: During a detailed excavation at
Uaxactun of Structure A-V (the "Palace"), led by Ledyard Smith, he
uncovered a complex and very informative stratigraphic sequence of
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the building's occupants (Smyth, Dove, and Dunning 1995:334). Did the
prehistoric inhabitants of Sayil use different kinds of artifacts in different
ways, and differing contexts? If you have low percentages of of cooking
vessels at Sayil's central district of monumental architecture, can one
"assume" that the large central Built Forms were not indicators of high status
elite residences? (Perhaps, the elites used some early form of "take out.") Here
are the ..."tentative explanations that account for a set of facts and can be
tested by further investigation." This is the process of scientifically
establishing hypotheses, or micro-theories. Questions for further description
and/or definition of the "context" remain.

Example Two - Peten and the Central Yucatan: In 1981, R. E. W. Adams and
Richard C. Jones of the University of Texas at San Antonio, also used a
"grounded" or more objective methodology of scientific procedure in
assessing the rank ordering and spatial patterning of Maya centers of the
central Peten and Yucatan Zones in the Maya lowland. This was done for the
purpose of inferring developmental sequencing in the Maya lowlands
(Adams and Jones 1981:301). They used their rank - ordered set of Maya cities
as a basis for other analytical techniques, and they used four regional areas
defined by architectural styles and spatial contiguity for testing (Adams and
Jones 1981:315). Their purpose is to provide a means for systematic
description and assessment of Maya cities. Maya cities were organized in a
highly distinctive pattern.
Major and minor inward upon a courtyard or plaza. Thus, the
various classes of Maya buildings come together in a physical and
functional association which can be termed the courtyard group
(Adams and Jones 1981:315).
Therefore, if Maya cities are defined as aggregates of courtyard groups, you
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architecture. It turned out that the Palace, was actually a complex of buildings,
built during twenty principal phases of construction and covering the whole
Classic period. It was recognized, that Structure A-V had likely changed from
a primarily religious complex to an elite residential/ office complex (Sabloff
1994:45). At this project, personal assessments of the architecture did not enter
into the analysis as it had for other investigations, such as for the architecture
at Mayapan, where an "elitist" initial assessment of the architecture had
previously colored the Carnegie reports and interpretations of the center
(Sabloff 1994:48). The fact that the Carnegie reports are somewhat dated does
change the fact that preceding methodologies, that are poorly structured,
obfuscate subsequent research efforts. It also reminds us that the variety of
previous research efforts over the past century are suspect without agreed
upon standards of objective, scientifically based methodologies. How does one
build from those who have gone before?

The problem of a lack of objectivity (ie., the misleading Carnegie reports)
arises when the aesthetics, or earlier theoretical assumptions distort the data.
For example, the concentric zone model (CZM) for Classic period Maya
centers, assumes that the most important and wealthy Maya resided near the
central districts with the largest and most elaborate architecture of major sites.
Therefore, elaborate buildings and elitism declined proportionately with the
distance from the site center (Arnold and Ford 1980:713). In other words,
... the distribution of elaborate in relation to ordinary architecture, is
assumed to be a direct reflection of the spatial organization of social
differentiation at Maya settlements (Smyth, Dove, and Duiming
1995:329).
Jeanne Arnold and Anabel Ford came up with similar questions regarding
the spatial structure of high status residential architecture at the Maya center
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of Tikal. They too did not look beyond the architectural remains in
"explaining" community organization. To their credit, they point out their
research limitations, while at the same time attacking the CZM.
Furthermore, interpretations of Classic Maya settlement patterning are
based heavily on assumption rather than on the analysis of
measurable archaeological evidence (Arnold and Ford 1980:713-714).
They had used the same cartographic data that had been used before.
Therefore, when the data base is not expanded, the door may open for a sort
of ..."is so, is not" dialogue among researchers.

Even more intriguing, is the criticism of Arnold's and Ford's work on this
subject by William A. Haviland. Haviland points out that essentially Arnold
and Ford mis- read the data (the maps). He says they did not include the
houses of the wealthy members of Tikal society "Thus, it is premature to
write the obituary of the concentric zonation model for the Classic period
Maya centers" (Haviland 1982:427). He mentions, that they were led astray by
his own early work and definitions of residential structures. He points out the
pitfalls of relying only on cartographic data. This is a helpful, though
somewhat ironic argument for the coherent, systematic, precise development
of archaeological data.

Example Four - Uxmal. Chichen Itza. and Palenque: The application of
systematic scientific principles in explaining the architecture, was also
demonstrated by Anthony Aveni and Horst Hartung in an article, wherein
they attack the interpretation of the layout and specific orientation of certain
components of Maya cities and ceremonial centers ie., Uxmal, Chichen Itza,
and Palenque (Aveni and Hartung 1982:63-64).
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Because we cannot use extant archaeological maps to solve our
problem (they are not accurate enough), we are forced to go to the field,
employing a surveyor's transit with an astronomical fix to derive the
absolute orientations of the walls of the Maya buildings (Aveni and
Hartung 1980: 64, Emphasis added).
Though their findings (considered by them as detailed hypotheses) are
interesting, the methodological value to us is found in their final
commentaries.
We believe that a further study of the precision and geometry in Maya
architecture, subject to all the caveats listed in our introduction, now
seems warranted. Their qualified interpretation was, that..."
architecture was another medium employed in the American tropics
for the storage and transmission of precise knowledge" (Aveni and
Hartung 1982:77).
Therefore, they have contributed to the data base, presented their hypothesis
and then motivated others to look further. They did not create theory or
confusing "bridging/macro type" theories that create confusion in the
analysis of these sites.

Example Five - Copan: In 1988-1989, Wendy Ashmore excavated buildings in
Copan, located in Western Honduras (Ashmore 1991:199). Ashmore was
there to examine a particular model of ancient Maya site planning and spatial
organization, in which the principles of architectural arrangement and their
directional associations derive from Maya cosmology (Ashmore 1991.199).
Studies of "symbolic expression" of prehistoric cultures are among the most
challenging and interpretively ambiguous areas of archaeological research.
Though she does discuss interpretive implications of her results, she carefully
qualifies the entire research project. "With respect to the ancient Maya, the
model of spatial conceptualization considered in this paper remains a
hypothesis."
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She also necessarily summarizes the status of her project for other interested
scholars:
Nevertheless, the Copan North Group research has begun a needed
explanation and refinement of the original derived hypotheses,
systematically applying archaeological data along with those from
epigraphy, linguistics, iconography, and ethnology, in a collaborative or
conjunctive approach gaining renewed momentum in Mesoamerica
research (Ashmore 1991:217-218, Emphasis added).
With her described "techniques," and succinct statement of the desired
procedure for this and related projects, Ashmore has made a meaningful
contribution towards the development of a uniform, coherent methodology,
as well as towards the goal of explanation.

Part VI - Discussion
Archaeology is currently built on systems of theories and methodologies.
Basic methodologies yield basic assumptions, or for example the hypothesis at
Sayil, that high-status elites "apparently" had greater access to high quality
and decorative ceramic wares. As a result, the researchers at Sayil then further
hypothesized, using ceramic data and correlating it with soil phosphates, that
building form "may" not necessarily be a direct expression of building
function or the social status of the building's occupants at least at Sayil.

Sapl and these other examples vary in sophistication, and all are not
necessarily projects of note. What is significant about them, is that they
provide illustrations of both the sound and problematical archaeological
techniques, as well as an essential order of investigation. These same
empirically, research grounded explanatory procedures seem to be absent
from the higher level theoretical dialogues.
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In these examples, we have seen the instruments of observation or
measurement being developed, and once procedures such as these are
recognized as valid observational techniques, then they will be taken for
granted, accepted and treated more as direct scientific observational
techniques. Hopefully, there will then be a stronger possibility for the sound
development of explanations and meanings from the record. The desire is for
the possibility of observing the past dynamics in the archaeological record, as
a scientist "directly" observes phenomena invisible to the human eyes, using
all kinds of specialized equipment (Tschauner 1996:4-5). We have been
stressing the "efforts" towards identifying the relative individual aspects of
anamorphosis material from which these explanatory concepts can then be
derived. This effort comes at the expense of general (fictional) theory making
and the dialogue that accompanies it. That is, it was an additional intent of
this study, aside from the obvious emphasis on archaeological techniques, to
caution against, or be wary of, the limitations of using broad assumptions and
theory created from partial or incomplete data.

It is somewhat popular today to use analogies from ethnoarchaeological
studies of architecture (social, behavioral, and, material correlates of different
forms) for theory building and so-called bridging theories. There is some
reluctance in putting much faith in these methods, there are too many
caveats associated with them. "It takes extreme discipline to be objective about
any issues, let alone one about which a person is emotionally engaged"
(Kuznar 1997:218). That is, the "human interest" of the scientist exerts an
influence on scientific inquiry to which he/ she must guard against. Instead, it
is suggested, to literally exhaust the development of better methods of for
interpreting the material aspects of whatever society is the subject matter The
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desired "theme" of archaeology thus becomes the quest for human
understanding using scientific principles (once they are defined). Then, we
will have the justifications to move research to the next step eg., bridging
theories or otherwise, whatever one wishes that to be.

If they understand what is meant by the concepts of empirical
observation, hypothesis, test, law, theory and explanation, they will be
able to evaluate their own work and that of others with respect to the
possible goals of archaeological research (Watson, Le Blanc and
Redman 1984:46).
The problematic nature of the crucial links between archaeological facts and
past events and behavior isn't going to disappear, however the theoretical
rhetoric is making the task even more complex than it need be at this stage of
data recovery. A comprehensive anthropological architectural study should
cover every aspect of the phenomena which contributes to the
materialization of the final form. It should show how architecture, its
components, and related artifacts work, and how they function in the context
of their environment and culture (Turan 1996:356-358). The point is to
acknowledge and understand the essential role of empirical observation and
measurement in this scientific enterprise (Bamforth and Spaulding 1982:183).

This is not to say that a scientific method can provide full understanding of
the data of archaeology, however, having as "accepted" as information as
possible obviously leads to better argument and explanation. Even the critics
of scientific archaeology would most likely benefit by these efforts. Who
knows, with this emphasis on reconstructing the discipline around scientific
tenets, someday explanation may, in a sense, be more likely to "spring forth"
from the material record. In any event, it is timely to take a step back (ie.,
forward), reexamine and reclaim the core purposes or tenets of archaeology
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and scientific archaeological inquiry.
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